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Runtime boundary

veryfront/fs uses the native process filesystem selected for Deno, Node, or Bun. It does not delegate to the runtime.get().fs adapter. Custom adapters configured with runtime.set() affect adapter-consuming APIs, not these compatibility functions. veryfront/fs does not add a project-root sandbox, block .env or other secret-file names, or validate paths from untrusted input. Relative paths resolve from cwd(). Absolute paths and .. segments can reach any location that the runtime permits. Runtime permissions remain the outer boundary. Hosted project secrets are supplied through request-owned environment data rather than .env files. Isolated Pages route ctx.fs is a separate, read-only, project-confined capability. Those protections do not change the contract of veryfront/fs. Canonicalize a trusted root and candidate with realPath, then use validateLexicalPath from veryfront/security before reading a user-influenced path. Canonicalization follows existing symlinks before the containment check. Path admission is not an operating-system sandbox. The trusted root must not be writable by untrusted or project code while a validated path is in use. Otherwise, concurrent filesystem changes can create a time-of-check/time-of-use race between validation and reading.

Import

Examples

File operations

Path utilities

Working directory

Confine an untrusted path

Exports

Functions

Classes

Types